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Abstract. This paper investigates asymmetry in US housing price cycles at the state and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
level, using the Triples test (Randles, Flinger, Policello, & Wolfe, 1980) and the Entropy test of Racine and Maasoumi 
(2007). Several reasons may account for asymmetry in housing prices, including non-linearity in their determinants and 
in behavioural responses, in particular linked to equity constraints and loss aversion. However, few studies have formally 
tested the symmetry of housing price cycles. We find that housing prices are asymmetric in the vast majority of cases. 
Taking into account the results of the two tests, deepness asymmetry, which represents differences in the magnitude of 
upswings and downturns, is found in 39 out of the 51 states (including the District of Columbia) and 238 out of the 381 
MSAs. Steepness asymmetry, which measures differences in the speed of price changes during upswings and downturns, is 
found in 40 states and 257 MSAs. These results imply that linear models are in most cases insufficient to capture housing 
price dynamics.
Keywords: asymmetry, house prices, US economy.
Introduction
Housing market developments have played a major role 
in the Great Recession, the largest contraction in US out-
put in decades. The meltdown of the subprime mortgage 
market in 2007 was at the epicentre of the global financial 
crisis, which was followed by a deep recession and years 
of lacklustre ecomomic performance. More generally, the 
literature has abundantly documented the links between 
housing market slumps, financial and banking crises and 
protracted economic recessions (e.g. Detken & Smets, 
2004; European Central Bank [ECB], 2005; Cecchetti, 
2008; Claessens, Kose, & Terrones, 2008; Reinhart & Ro-
goff, 2009; International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2011; 
Jordá, Schularick, & Taylor, 2014). Hence, it is essential 
for economists and policymakers to better understand the 
properties of housing price cycles. Chronologies covering 
large samples of countries have been established. They 
show that housing prices generally exhibit long, ample and 
asymmetric cycles. Girouard, Kennedy, Van den Noord, 
and André (2006) find that the typical duration of a real 
housing price cycle in a sample of 18 OECD countries over 
the period 1970Q1−2005Q1 is around 10 years, roughly 
similar to that of the business cycle, with which it has been 
synchronised most of the time, with the notable exception 
of the early 2000s. The expansion lasts about 23 quarters, 
during which real housing prices increase by about 45% 
and the contraction lasts around 18 quarters, with prices 
falling by around 25%. Igan and Loungani (2012) find in 
a sample of 55 advanced and emerging economies over 
the period 1970−2010 that the typical expansion lasts 16 
quarters with real housing prices increasing by 37%, while 
the average contraction lasts 11 quarters with real housing 
prices falling by 17%.
However, few studies have formally tested for asymme-
try in aggregate housing prices. Against this background, 
this paper investigates asymmetry in housing price series 
for the 50 US states plus the District of Columbia and 
381 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) using monthly 
Freddie Mac House Price Indices spanning the period 
1975:1-2015:6. The choice of this dataset is motivated by 
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the availability of a large set of high quality, methodologi-
cally consistent series, with a wide coverage of the Unit-
ed States. Developments in housing prices tend to vary 
widely across US states and MSAs. For example, over the 
past decade or so, the “Sand states” (Arizona, California, 
Florida, Nevada) experienced dramatic boom-bust cycles, 
while the housing cycle was muted in large parts of the 
Midwest. Hence the use of disaggregated data allows a 
more precise assessment of the extent of asymmetry in 
the housing price cycle than the use of broad aggregates, 
which may mask specific market evolutions.
The methodology used for investigating asymmetry in 
this paper draws on the literature on business cycle asym-
metry (Sichel, 1993; Verbrugge, 1997; Razzak, 2001). More 
specifically, we use the Triples test (Randles et al., 1980), 
which beyond its traditional use in business cycle analysis, 
has been used, for example, to test asymmetry in elec-
tricity demand in G7 countries (Narayan & Popp, 2009) 
and in health expenditure in the United States (Zerihun, 
Cunado, & Gupta, 2016). The Triples test has been used 
by Cook (2006) to investigate asymmetry in UK housing 
prices. We complement the Triples test results by using the 
Entropy test of Racine and Maasoumi (2007). While in 
many cases both tests give similar results, the Entropy test 
detects more cases of asymmetry. However, some cases of 
asymmetry are detected by Triples test but not by the En-
tropy test, justifying the use of both tests. In addition, the 
Triples test distinguishes between positive and negative 
asymmetry, which is useful for the economic interpreta-
tion of the results.
We investigate both the deepness and steepness of cy-
cles. Deepness measures the relative magnitude of peaks 
and troughs. Steepness measures the speed at which peaks 
and troughs are reached. A thorough technical description 
is provided in the methodological section. But let us pro-
vide at this stage a summary description of possible cases 
of asymmetry and give examples, anticipating on results 
described below (Figure 1). Positive deepness asymmetry 
implies that peaks are high, while downturns are relative-
ly mild. Such a pattern can be observed in Connecticut. 
Negative deepness asymmetry is characterised by mod-
est peaks but deep recessions, as illustrated by Oklahoma. 
Positive steepness asymmetry indicates rapid increases 
followed by slower declines in prices, as seen in Hawaii. 
Negative steepness asymmetry refers to rapid price falls 
following slower increases, a pattern observed in Geor-
gia. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
which carries out an extensive analysis of asymmetry in 
US housing prices at the regional (states and MSAs) level. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 1 briefly reviews the literature. Section 2 presents the 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 dis-
cusses the empirical results. Last section concludes.
1. Brief literature review
The literature points to a number of factors that can explain 
the cyclicality of housing prices. First, housing prices are 
closely related to the business cycle (see André (2010), for 
evidence from a sample of OECD countries and Leamer 
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Figure 1. Types of asymmetry: illustrative examples (source: Freddy Mac)
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(2007), for evidence from the United States). Second, the 
financial cycle is an additional source of housing price fluc-
tuations. While there is no commonly agreed definition of 
the financial cycle, it can be described as “self-reinforcing 
interactions between perceptions of value and risk, atti-
tudes towards risk and financing constraints, which trans-
late into booms followed by busts” (Borio, 2012). The fi-
nancial cycle also relates to the notion of pro-cyclicality 
of the financial system and the financial accelerator, where 
increases in credit and in the value of collateral reinforce 
each other (Kiyotaki & Moore, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, & 
Gilchrist, 1998; Aoki, Proudman, & Vlieghe, 2002). Third, 
cyclicality can be induced by the combination of extrapo-
lative expectations and slow supply responses, which can 
generate hog-type cycles (André, 2015). Getting construc-
tion permits and building homes takes time and there is 
evidence that the rate of appreciation of housing prices 
over the preceding four years is a good proxy for the ex-
pected rate of housing price increase in several countries 
(Muellbauer, 2012). Fourth, momentum traders, who be-
lieve it is a good time to buy a dwelling because housing 
prices will rise further, can significantly amplify the hous-
ing price cycle (Shiller, 2007; Piazzesi & Schneider, 2009).
While the cyclicality of housing prices is well docu-
mented in the literature, little attention has been paid so 
far to the statistical properties of housing price cycles. In 
particular, few studies have formally tested the symmetry 
of housing price cycles, despite the existence of theoreti-
cal reasons for potential asymmetry and the implications 
for modelling and forecasting. Before reviewing the exist-
ing empirical studies on asymmetry and non-linearity in 
housing prices, a brief discussion of the potential causes 
of asymmetry is in order. Asymmetry in housing cycles 
may result from asymmetry in the determinants of hous-
ing prices and/or from non-linearity in the relationships 
between these determinants and housing prices. Determi-
nants of housing cycles may behave in an asymmetric way. 
The main determinants of housing prices, besides gener-
ally relatively slow-moving variables like demographics 
and the dwelling stock, are household income and mort-
gage interest rates. Zerihun et al. (2016) find asymmetric 
behaviour of real per capita personal disposable income 
in only 7 US states. This is consistent with the general 
finding of little evidence of asymmetry in aggregate US 
GDP or GNP (Sichel, 1993; Verbrugge, 1997; Razzak, 
2001). Mortgage interest rates seem to behave in a more 
asymmetric way. This may result from two causes. First, 
monetary policy reaction functions to inflation and output 
may be asymmetric. However, empirical support for this 
hypothesis in the United States is mixed. Dolado, María-
Dolores, and Naveira (2005) find that under certain con-
ditions, the optimal monetary policy is non-linear, with 
stronger reactions when inflation or output is above target 
than when they are below target. Nonetheless, they find no 
asymmetry in the interest rate-setting behaviour of the US 
Federal Reserve (henceforth, Fed) over the period 1984–
2001. Other studies show that the Fed’s reaction function 
has changed over time. Favero and Rovelli (2003), in a 
study covering the period 1961−1998, find that the pol-
icy preferences of the Fed have changed drastically after 
1979. Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) find evidence of 
non-linearity in US interest-rate reaction functions, with 
substantial variations over sub-periods within the sample 
1960–2005. Second, several studies on the United States 
and other countries show the presence of asymmetry in 
the pass-through from policy rates to bank lending rates. 
Payne and Waters (2008) find asymmetric pass-through 
from the federal funds rate to the prime rate over the peri-
od 1987–2005. Asymmetric pass-through between policy 
rates and bank mortgage or other lending rates has also 
been documented in other countries, including Australia 
(Lim, 2001; Valadkhani & Anwar, 2012), Ireland (Goggin, 
Holton, Kelly, Lydonm, & McQuinn, 2012) and Switzer-
land (Cecchin, 2011).
Even in the absence of asymmetry in their determi-
nants, housing prices may display asymmetry as a re-
sult of non-linearity in the relationship between housing 
prices and their determinants. The magnitude and speed 
of diffusion of economic shocks to housing prices varies 
across regions because of structural differences in hous-
ing markets (Meen, 1999). Ripple effect are often observed 
in housing markets, as price increases in prime locations 
induce buyers to move to more affordable areas. In par-
ticular, several studies document ripple effects in the 
United States (Pollakowski & Ray, 1997; Vansteenkiste, 
2007; Canarella, Miller, & Pollard, 2012; Gupta & Miller, 
2012a, 2012b). In a series of papers, Cook shows that tak-
ing asymmetry into account is essential in the analysis of 
ripple effects and housing price convergence. Using asym-
metric unit root tests, he demonstrates that UK housing 
price adjustments are asymmetric and that taking this 
feature into account allows identifying widespread hous-
ing price convergence across regions (Cook, 2003). He 
shows that allowing for asymmetry helps detect long-run 
relationships in UK regional housing prices (Cook, 2005). 
Analysing cyclical sub-samples, he finds that UK regional 
housing price convergence is strongest during downturns 
(Cook, 2012). Cook and Watson (2016) examine the diffu-
sion of changes in housing prices across UK regions over 
cyclical sub-samples. They find evidence of a ripple effect, 
especially strong from London to contiguous regions. 
They also uncover that comovement is strongest during 
upturns than downturns. Chiang and Tsai (2016), allow-
ing for asymmetry, find ripple effects in US regional hous-
ing markets, originating from Los Angeles, New York and 
Miami. Comovement is again found to be stronger dur-
ing upswings than downswings. Wu, Lu, Chen, and Chu 
(2017) also find that comovement between US regional 
housing prices is time-dependent, with in particular a fall 
in correlations in 2006, which is consistent with the pre-
vious findings of weaker comovement during downturns 
than upturns.
The behavioural literature shows that asymmetry in 
housing prices may result from equity constraints and 
loss aversion. Stein (1995) highlights the impact of re-
quired downpayments for the purchase of homes on 
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potential sellers. In depressed markets, liquidity con-
strained households are reluctant to sell if the downpay-
ment requirement makes them unable to purchase a new 
home. This may increase the volatility of housing prices 
relative to standard efficient market settings and account 
for the positive correlation between housing prices and 
transactions. Moreover, Stein’s model contributes to ex-
plaining differences in housing price cycles across states 
or cities, among which the proportion of households with 
high loan-to-value ratios differs, affecting downpayment 
capacities. Loss aversion is another potential explanation 
for low transaction volumes following price falls. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1991) show in experimental settings that 
individuals tend to show loss aversion. Empirical studies 
support the hypothesis of loss aversion in housing mar-
kets. Genesove and Mayer (2001) find evidence of loss 
aversion in the Boston condominium market in the 1990s. 
More specifically, they find that condominium owners fac-
ing nominal losses set higher asking prices, achieve higher 
selling prices and exhibit a much lower sale hazard than 
other sellers. Engelhardt (2003) finds that nominal loss 
aversion significantly affects household mobility in the 
United States over the period 1985–1996. Conversely, he 
finds little evidence that low equity resulting from lower 
housing prices constrains mobility. Anenberg (2011) finds 
strong evidence that, in the San Francisco Bay Area real 
estate market over the period 1988–2005, owners facing 
nominal losses and those with high loan-to-value ratios 
sell on average for higher prices than other sellers.
Non-linearity can also be induced by expectations 
of housing prices, which can generate bubbles. As not-
ed above, expectations tend to be extrapolative. In other 
words, the lagged appreciation of housing prices acts as a 
“bubble builder”. But at some point the deviation of hous-
ing prices from fundamentals acts as a “bubble burster” 
(Abraham & Hendershott, 1996; Muellbauer & Murphy, 
2008). Such dynamics are bound to generate asymmet-
ric cycles, especially as events triggering the bursting of a 
bubble are largely random. Furthermore, Bolt, Demertzis, 
Diks, Hommes, and Van der Leij (2014) find evidence of 
heterogeneity in housing price expectations with tempo-
rary switching between fundamental-reverting and trend-
following beliefs in eight countries, including the United 
States, over the period 1970−2013. They show that a hous-
ing market model with heterogenous expectations and en-
dogenous switching between optimistic and pessimistic 
expectations generates non-linear aggregate price fluctua-
tions with booms and busts triggered by stochastic shocks 
and strongly amplified by self-fulfilling expectations.
Other potential sources of non-linearity in housing 
price behaviour have been identified in the literature. For 
example, Chowdhuri and Maclennan (2014) point to the 
asymmetric effect of monetary policy on UK housing pric-
es over the period 1980−2012, which they relate to vari-
ations in the degree of asymmetric information depend-
ing on the state of the economy. Tsai (2013) also finds an 
asymmetric impact of monetary policy (proxied by money 
supply) on UK housing prices from 1986 to 2011 and re-
lates it to downward price rigidity. Antonakakis, Gupta, 
and André (2015) show that housing market returns are 
affected in a non-linear way by economic policy uncer-
tainty.
The empirical literature focussing on linearity tests and 
relative performances of linear and non-linear models also 
finds some support for non-linearity in US housing prices. 
Kim and Bhattacharya (2009) find non-linearity over the 
period 1969−2004 in US aggregate housing prices and 
in three of the four Census regions, the exception being 
the Midwest. Miles (2008) estimates a generalized autore-
gressive (GAR) model over the period 1979−2005 in five 
US states – California, Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio and 
Texas – and performs out-of-sample forecasts of housing 
prices at a two, five and ten year horizon. He finds that 
the GAR model significantly improves forecasting per-
formances in states with volatile housing markets, such 
as California, while they bring little improvement in rela-
tively stable markets, such as Ohio. Balcilar, Gupta, and 
Miller (2015) find evidence of non-linearity in US ag-
gregate housing prices and the four Census regions over 
the period 1968–2000. However, they find that linear and 
non-linear models perform similarly in out-of-sample 
forecasting at short horizons.
Altogether, there are many reasons which could ac-
count for asymmetry in housing price cycles. Nevertheless, 
the literature investigating asymmetry in aggregate hous-
ing price series is quite limited. In particular, few studies 
have formally tested for asymmetry in aggregate housing 
prices. Cook (2006) investigates asymmetric behavior in 
the UK housing market, using national and regional data 
spanning the period 1973−2004. He performs the Triples 
test (Randles et al., 1980), which is also used in the present 
paper. Cook finds extensive asymmetry in UK housing 
prices, with cyclical peaks typically of greater magnitude 
than corresponding troughs. Li (2015) finds asymmetry 
in serial correlation and mean reversion in Californian 
metropolitan housing prices, specifically downward price 
rigidity and greater mean reversion during downturns. 
Canepa and Chini (2016) estimate a generalised smooth 
transition model on Irish, Spanish, UK and US housing 
prices to show evidence of dynamic asymmetries in cy-
cles, with expansions at exponential rates and contractions 
at logarithmic rates, resulting in longer contractions than 
expansions.
2. Methodology: the Triples and Entropy tests
The Triples test was initially developed by Randles et al. 
(1980). Testing deepness asymmetry requires decompos-
ing the series into trend and cyclical components. In or-
der to do so, the Hodrick-Prescott filter can be used (see 
for example, Razzak, 2001; Narayan, 2009; Zerihun et al., 
2016, amongst others). Steepness is tested using first dif-
ferenced data.
Formally, the Triples test can be described as follows: 
let xi,…, xN denote a random sample drawn from F (x – θ) 
where F(·) is a cumulative distribution function for a con-
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implies asymmetry. Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
implies symmetry.
The simple nature of ( )*f ⋅  makes 1 2, ζ ζ  and 3ζ  ex-
pressible in terms of probabilities, and thus it is possible 
to use U statistics to estimate these quantities consistently 
as follows:
( )*1 1 1 var f x ζ =    with ( ) ( )* *1 1 1 f x E f = ⋅  ;  (9)
( )( )21 *1 1
1
,ˆ
N
i
i
N f x−
=
ζ = −η∑   (10)
where:
( ) ( )* *1 11 , ,2i i j kj k
j i k
N
f x f x x x
<
≠ ≠
− 
= ∑  
 
∑ . (11)
Similarly,
( )( )2*2 21 , 
2
ˆi k
j k
f x x
N <
ζ = ∑ −η
 
  
 
∑ ,  (12)
where:
( ) ( )* *2
1
1, , ,
2j k i j ki
j i k
i k
f x x f x x x
N =
≠ ≠
≠
= ∑
− ∑ ,  (13)
and
2
3
1
9
ˆζ = −η .  (14)
Replacing each with iζ  and ˆ iζ  in the expressions Nσ  
and Aσ  gives the estimators ˆNσ  and ˆ Aσ . Both estima-
tors are consistent because each ˆ iζ  is written as a linear 
combination of U statistics.
To test the hypothesis in (8), the Triples test is de-
fined on the basis of 1/21 ˆ ˆ/ NT n= η σ  and an associated 
test based on 1/22 ˆ ˆ/ AT n= η σ  so that they reject 0H  as 
( )/2iT Z α> , 1,2i =  and ( )/2Z α  is as the upper percentile 
of the standard normal distribution. Note that these tests 
are asymptotically distribution free provided only that the 
underlying distribution is not degenerate.
The entropy test of asymmetry described in Racine 
and Maasoumi (2008) is based on the normalization of 
the Bhattacharya – Hellinger statistic measure of depend-
ence pS  given by:
21 1
2 2
1 2
1 dy
2p
S f f
+∞
−∞
 
= − 
 
∫ ,  (15)
where: ( )1 yf f=  is the marginal density of a continu-
ous stationary random variable iY , and ( )2 yˆf f=  that 
of iY ; iY being a rotation of iY  about its mean i.e. 
 ( )2i i iY Y E Y= − + . The vector iY  is parametrically asym-
metric about the mean if ( ) ( )ˆy yf f≡  which corresponds 
to the following test of asymmetry:
( ) ( )0 : y yˆH f f=  for all y.
tinuous population with ( ) 10
2
F =  and θ is the median of 
the x population.
Let,
( ) ( ) ( )( )
3
*
 2  2
, ,
 2
,
i j k i k j
i j k
j k i
sign x x x sign x x x
f x x x
sign x x x
 + − + + − +
 =
 + −  
(1)
where: ( ) 1, 0 sign u = − or 1 when u is equal, greater, or 
smaller than 0.
, ,i j kx x x  forms a right triple if ( )* 1, , 3i j kf x x x = . 
Note that ( )* , ,i j kf x x x  can only assume the values 
1/ 3, 0,1 / 3 . A left triple is defined as any ( ), ,i j kx x x  for 
which ( )* 1, , 3i j kf x x x
−
= . When ( )* , , 0i j kf x x x = , the 
triple is neither right nor left skewed. This last event, how-
ever, has probability zero when sampling from a continu-
ous population. The proposed test statistics is then the U 
statistics given by:
( )
1
* ,ˆ  ,
3 i j ki j k
N
f x x x
−
< <
 
η =   
 
∑ . (2)
So that
( ) ( )     ˆ  
3
3
number of right triples number of left triples
N
 − η =
  
      
. (3)
It follows from Hoeffding (1948) that this is a U sta-
tistics estimate
( ) { } { }1 2 3 1 2 32 0ˆ 2 0E Pr X X X Pr X X Xη = η = + − > − + − < , 
(4)
with
( )
1 3
1
3 3
3
ˆ
3 cc
N N
var
c c
−
=
−    
η = ζ        −    
∑ ,  (5)
where:
( )* 1, ,c c cvar f x x ζ = …  ,  (6)
and
( ) ( )* *1 1 1 3, , , , ,  , ,  c c c cf x x E f x x x x+ … = … …  .  (7)
Letting 2 19Aσ = ζ  and since ( )2 2 1N Aσ = σ + σ , Ran-
dles et  al. (1980) use the Slutsky theorem to show that 
( )1/2 ˆ AN = η−η ⁄σ  also has a standard normal limiting 
distribution. The appropriate hypotheses to be tested now 
need to be discussed. First, note that if the underlying dis-
tribution is symmetric, 1 2 32X X X+ −  has the same dis-
tribution as 1 2 32X X X− − +  and therefore, 0η = . Hence 
ηˆ  can be used as a statistic for testing,
0 : 0ˆH η =  versus 1 : 0ˆH η ≠ .  (8)
This is a two-sided test, but it can be used as a one-
sided test. This test is used to test the hypothesis that the 
distribution is symmetric around the unknown median 
θ against a broad class of asymmetric alternatives. The 
Triples test can be interpreted according to the hypoth-
esis tested in equation (8). Rejecting the null hypothesis 
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To obtain an entropy version of this asymmetry test; 
Racine and Maasoumi (2007, 2008) make use of the stand-
ard Parzen kernel estimators (see Parzen, 1962) of the sta-
tistic pS  with a specific number of bootstrap resampling 
based on Efron (1982)’s methodology.1
3. Data
The measure of housing prices used in this study is the 
monthly Freddie Mac house price index (FMHPI) cover-
ing the period 1975:01-2015:06. The FMHPI is a repeat-
sales index covering transactions on one-family detached 
and townhome properties serving as collateral on loans 
purchased by Freddy Mac or Fannie Mae. The repeat-sales 
methodology is widely used to measure housing price 
changes, particularly in the United States. The most prom-
inent examples are the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), Standard & Poor᾽s (S&P) Case-Shiller and Core-
Logic house price indices. By measuring the evolution of 
the value of the same property between two transactions, 
the repeat-sales methodology allows to measure price 
changes holding constant property type and location. 
A limitation of the procedure is that significant renovation 
or deterioration of the property may affect price changes. 
However, in the case of the FMHPI, this problem is miti-
gated by the exclusion of outliers. The FMHPI includes 
appraisal values related to refinancing transactions in ad-
dition to home sales/purchases, with the restriction that 
at least one transaction in a pair must be a purchase. Ap-
praisal values may be less accurate than purchase prices. 
However, the inclusion of refinancing transactions more 
than quadruples the sample size to over 25 million pairs 
between 1975 and 2010. Increasing the sample particularly 
increases the quality of estimates at a disaggregated level. 
Furthermore, the calculation of the FMHPI accounts for 
potential systematic deviations between appraisal values 
and purchase prices.2
The main advantage of the FMHPI in the context of 
this study is that it provides monthly data at the MSA 
level. A limitation to bear in mind is that the FMHPI 
only covers transactions associated with conforming loans 
purchased by Freddy Mac or Fannie Mae. This excludes 
subprime loans and loans with an amount in excess of the 
ceiling for conforming loans. Conforming loans account 
for the vast majority of mortgages. However, in some pe-
riods non-conforming loans make a significant share of 
mortgage originations. For example, at its peak in the 
middle of the first decade of the new century, subprime 
mortgages accounted for about 20% of mortgage origina-
tions. While it is unlikely to dramatically affect the shape 
of the housing price cycle, the exclusion of some transac-
1 The R codes for the implementation of this test are provided 
in the np package of the R software freely available at: http://
www.r-project.org.
2 For more details on the FMHPI, see http://www.freddiemac.
com/finance/fmhpi.
tions may dampen somewhat the volatility of prices and 
the amplitude of the cycle over some periods. Conversely, 
the use of weights based on end of previous year estimated 
property values in the FMHPI is bound to amplify cycles 
compared with measures using weights based on numbers 
of housing units, such as the FHFA index.
Series have been adjusted for seasonality using the 
standard US Census Bureau X13 ARIMA-SEATS Seasonal 
Adjustment Program. Series have not been adjusted for 
inflation, because asymmetry in the behaviour of housing 
prices is likely to result, at least in part, from nominal ri-
gidities, as suggested by the discussion of loss aversion and 
equity constraints above. Table 1 provides a summary de-
scription of the data. The average housing price monthly 
growth rate over the sample period is 0.39% (4.76% an-
nualized) for the United States. Prices are volatile, with 
a standard deviation of 0.48% and an average absolute 
deviation from trend of 0.36%. Differences between states 
and across MSAs in average growth rates and volatility 
are fairly large.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Average 
growth rate
Standard 
deviation
Average absolute 
deviation from 
trend
USA
0.3884 0.4764 0.3555
States
Min 0.2305 0.4388 0.3395
Max 0.5907 1.4410 0.8500
Q1 0.2960 0.5580 0.4286
Median 0.3370 0.6644 0.5043
Q3 0.3825 0.8117 0.6134
MSAs
Min 0.1037 0.4022 0.3074
Max 0.6250 1.4786 0.9414
Q1 0.2650 0.5751 0.4369
Median 0.3050 0.6708 0.5123
Q3 0.3548 0.8308 0.6150
Note: Q1 and Q3 correspond to the first and third quartile of the distri-
bution, respectively. The trend is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter, with λ = 14,400.
4. Results
The Triples test finds deepness asymmetry in 8 states, 
amounting to about 16% of the total (51, including the 
District of Columbia), and steepness asymmetry in 22 
states, or more than 40% of the total (Table 2).3 Results 
at the MSA level are consistent with those at the state 
level. Evidence of deepness asymmetry is found in about 
3 The significance threshold used throughout this paper is 10%, 
unless otherwise specified.
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8% of MSAs (29 out of 381) and steepness asymmetry in 
about 40% (154). Positive deepness asymmetry is found 
in 5 states and 11 MSAs. Negative deepness asymmetry 
is found in 3 states and 18 MSAs. Steepness asymmetry 
is more common, with positive cases in 12 states and 55 
MSAs and negative cases in 10 states and 100 MSAs. States 
with asymmetric cycles generally contain a number of 
MSAs where asymmetry of the same type is found. For ex-
ample, Massachusetts has 3 MSAs with positive steepness 
asymmetry, California has 7 MSAs with negative steepness 
and Michigan has 9. This confirms that asymmetry is not 
the result of an aggregation artifact.
The varying forms of asymmetry across states and 
MSAs suggest that different underlying economic factors 
are at play in different places. The Triples test allows dis-
tinguishing positive from negative forms of asymmetry, 
which provides further insights into the economic inter-
pretation of asymmetry. Positive deepness asymmetry, 
corresponding to high peaks followed by mild downturns, 
is mainly found in small states of the North-East of the 
country (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine and Vermont). In 
these states, the relative scarcity of land may put a floor 
on housing prices. The only MSA within these states ex-
hibiting deepness asymmetry is Portland-South Portland 
(Maine). Positive deepness asymmetry is also found in 
South Dakota (and its MSA of Sioux Falls), but the am-
plitude of the cycle there is low (Figure 2). Positive steep-
ness asymmetry is found in 12 states. Half of them are 
in the densely populated North East, while the others are 
scattered all over the country, including Hawaii. Evidence 
of positive steepness asymmetry at the state level is associ-
ated with the presence of at least one MSA exhibiting the 
same property, except in Vermont, where nevertheless one 
MSA (Burlington-South Burlington) comes close to the 
10% confidence threshold.
Index, 2000m12 = 100
Figure 2. Housing price cycles displaying positive deepness 
asymmetry (source: Freddy Mac)
Steep downturns are found in several states of the 
Midwest, where the decline in traditional industries has 
severely hit the economy. Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin 
show negative steepness asymmetry at the 5% confidence 
level and Illinois at the 10% level. In these states, negative 
steepness asymmetry also appears at the MSA level. Hous-
ing prices in Wisconsin, in addition to negative steepness 
asymmetry, show negative deepness asymmetry. These 
features are also observed in many of its MSAs. While 
Midwest states did not experience very sharp increases in 
housing prices, they suffered steep falls following the latest 
economic recession (Figure 3).
Index, 2000m12 = 100
Figure 3. Asymmetric housing price cycles in the Midwest 
(source: Freddy Mac)
Developments in other states where asymmetry is 
found seem more idiosyncratic. Negative deepness asym-
metry in Alaska and Oklahoma is related to a marked 
downturn in the late 1980s. Deepness asymmetry is ob-
served in Oklahoma city, but not in MSAs in Alaska. 
States characterised by positive steepness asymmetry in-
clude Hawaii, which has experienced a number of steep 
increases in housing prices over the sample period, Idaho, 
which had a housing price spike in the mid-2000s, North 
Dakota, where the recent oil and gas boom boosted hous-
ing prices. Positive steepness asymmetry is also present 
in Nebraska and New Mexico, but with relatively low 
amplitude cycles. The latest economic downturn, during 
Table 2. Housing price asymmetry in  
US states according to the Triples test.
Statistically significant at the 10% confidence level
Deepness Steepness
Positive Negative Positive Negative
Connecticut Alaska Connecticut California
Delaware Oklahoma Hawaii Georgia
Maine Wisconsin Idaho Illinois
South Dakota Massachusetts Louisiana
Vermont North Dakota Michigan
Nebraska New 
Hampshire
New Jersey Ohio
New Mexico Oregon
New York Virginia
Rhode Island Wisconsin
Utah
Vermont
Note: Triples test z-statistics and p-values are reported in Table A1.
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which prices declined rapidly, drives negative steepness 
asymmetry in Georgia and Virginia, as well as Oregon. 
Sharp housing price falls between mid-2006 and mid-2012 
largely account for negative steepness asymmetry in Cali-
fornia. Furthermore, the expansion of subprime lending 
during the early 2000s, followed by an abrupt reduction 
in mortgage credit after the global financial crisis may ac-
count for quick falls in housing prices, at least in some 
parts of the state. The type of steepness asymmetry found 
in these states is also present in at least one of its MSAs.
The Entropy test does not allow distinguishing be-
tween positive and negative forms of asymmetry, which 
restrains its economic interpretation. However, it detects 
much more cases of asymmetry than the Triples test (Ta-
ble 3). Deepness asymmetry is found in 35 states (nearly 
70% of the total) and 226 MSAs (nearly 60% of the total). 
Steepness asymmetry is found in 35 states (nearly 70% of 
the total) and 228 MSAs (nearly 60% of the total). As the 
literature suggests that the Entropy test is more powerful 
than the Triples test (Racine & Maasoumi, 2007, 2008), it 
is possible to conclude that asymmetry in housing prices 
is the norm. Furthermore, as assuming symmetry when 
the series display asymmetric behaviour can lead to bi-
ased econometric estimates and forecasts, and erroneous 
economic conclusions, asymmetry should systematically 
be envisaged when modelling housing prices.
The Entropy test results differ from those of the Tri-
ples test for some of the “Sand states” (Arizona, Califor-
nia, Florida, Nevada), which are particularly interesting 
because they contributed most to the US housing price 
boom which preceded the Great Recession. Prices sky-
rocketed in the mid-2000s, but collapsed rapidly after the 
subprime crisis, as over-valuation became obvious, over-
supply proved massive and credit dried up (Figure 4). 
The Triples test found negative steepness asymmetry in 
California, a result confirmed by the Entropy test, which 
however also finds deepness in that state. The Entropy 
test identifies both deepness and steepness asymmetry 
in Arizona and Nevada. No evidence of asymmetry is 
found in Florida, which conforms to the Triples test re-
sults. However, asymmetry is present in the MSA which 
includes Miami and a number of other MSAs in Florida, 
as it is present in the largest MSAs of other “Sand states”. 
A precise characterisation of cyclical patterns is difficult in 
these states, in part because, except in California, the large 
boom-bust cycle of the 2000s was preceded by only fairly 
mild cycles. The rebound in housing prices over the past 
few years, suggests that cyclicality is here to stay. More ob-
servations will be necessary to delineate a cyclical shape, 
but asymmetry cannot be ruled out.
To sum up, housing cycle asymmetry is found in the 
majority of US states and MSAs. However, it takes differ-
ent shapes in different areas, suggesting underlying causes 
differ. While the most intuitive case of downward rigid-
ity of housing prices, especially related to loss aversion, is 
widespread, cases where housing price falls are of greater 
magnitude than increases are also found, predominantly 
in areas hit by adverse economic shocks. The Triples test 
results for steepness asymmetry suggest that in many cases 
housing price adjustments towards troughs are faster than 
towards peak, indicating that deviations from equilibrium 
are often corrected in an abrupt way.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated asymmetry in US housing 
price cycles at the state and MSA level, using the Triples 
test (Randles et al., 1980) and the Entropy test of Racine 
and Maasoumi (2007). Several reasons may account for 
asymmetry in housing prices, including non-linearity 
in their determinants and in behavioural responses, in 
particular linked to equity constraints and loss aversion. 
However, few studies have formally tested the symmetry 
of housing price cycles. Both the Triples and the Entropy 
Table 3. Summary of asymmetry tests results
States
Deepness Triples test 8
Entropy test 35 (For the states, there are 43 
cases in all of which 4 cases are 
overlapping)
MSAs
Triples test 29
Entropy test 226 (For the MSAs, there are 255 
cases in all of which 17 cases are 
overlapping)
States
Steepness Triples test 22
Entropy test 35 (For the states, there are 57 
cases in all of which 17 cases are 
overlapping)
MSAs
Triples test 155
Entropy test 228 (For the MSAs, there are 382 
cases in all of which 126 cases are 
overlapping)
Note: The significance threshold is 10%. Triples test values are reported 
in Tables A1 and A2. The list of states and MSAs displaying asymmetry 
is reported in Tables A3 and A4.
Index, 2000m12 = 100
Figure 4. Housing price cycles in the “Sand states”  
(source: Freddy Mac)
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test point to widespread asymmetry in US housing prices, 
even though the Entropy test detects more cases than the 
Triples test. In a majority of cases, asymmetry identified 
by the Triples test is also detected by the Entropy test, but 
there are some exceptions. Altogether, taking into account 
the results of both tests, deepness asymmetry is found in 
39 of the 51 states (including the District of Columbia) 
and 238 of the 381 MSAs. Steepness asymmetry is found 
in 40 states and 257 MSAs. These results imply that poten-
tial asymmetry needs to be taken into account when ana-
lysing housing price dynamics. In particular, linear models 
may not provide an adequate description of the data and 
may display low forecasting performances. The relatively 
high occurrence of negative steepness asymmetry suggests 
that linear models may underestimate the likelihood that 
deviations from equilibrium are corrected in an abrupt 
way. Potential asymmetry also has consequences for the 
analysis of comovement and convergence in housing pric-
es, as differences in adjustments over different cycle phases 
may blur price diffusion patterns.
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Appendix
Table A1. Triples test for US States and national aggregate
 State Steepness Deepness
z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
AK −0.8508 0.3949 −2.324 0.0201
AL −1.5146 0.1299 −0.2401 0.8102
AR −0.5332 0.5939 0.3783 0.7052
AZ −0.2782 0.7809 −0.6999 0.4840
CA −2.6196 0.0088 0.4495 0.6531
CO −0.7044 0.4812 0.2317 0.8167
CT 2.7676 0.0056 1.8418 0.0655
DC −0.5718 0.5675 −0.1086 0.9135
DE −0.0567 0.9548 2.3182 0.0204
FL −0.6871 0.4920 −0.6239 0.5327
GA −2.1248 0.0336 0.5909 0.5546
HI 3.2437 0.0012 0.5634 0.5732
IA −1.1276 0.2595 −0.7957 0.4262
ID 1.9794 0.0478 0.4378 0.6616
IL −1.8067 0.0708 −0.0647 0.9484
IN −0.2153 0.8295 −0.2893 0.7723
KS 0.8798 0.3790 0.4643 0.6424
KY 0.5731 0.5666 −0.1011 0.9195
LA −1.7245 0.0846 0.1183 0.9058
MA 2.0681 0.0386 −0.5046 0.6134
MD −1.4905 0.1361 0.5852 0.5584
ME 0.4874 0.6260 2.6178 0.0088
MI −2.0880 0.0368 −0.1057 0.9158
MN −0.4528 0.6507 −0.9858 0.3242
MO −0.3046 0.7606 0.1400 0.8886
MS 0.7288 0.4661 0.8022 0.4224
 State Steepness Deepness
z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
MT −0.8562 0.3919 1.2398 0.2151
NC −1.4510 0.1468 0.3974 0.6911
ND 2.5718 0.0101 −0.8392 0.4013
NE 2.1131 0.0346 0.9043 0.3658
NH −2.5398 0.0111 1.0857 0.2776
NJ 2.1968 0.0280 1.4534 0.1461
NM 2.7444 0.0061 1.0244 0.3056
NV −0.0594 0.9526 −0.7370 0.4611
NY 2.5578 0.0105 1.4764 0.1398
OH −2.0161 0.0438 −0.7845 0.4328
OK −0.6695 0.5031 −2.1182 0.0342
OR −2.4876 0.0129 −0.5604 0.5752
PA 0.2946 0.7683 −0.3782 0.7053
RI 4.5012 0.0000 0.2126 0.8316
SC −0.5004 0.6168 0.5650 0.5721
SD −0.6591 0.5098 2.8492 0.0044
TN 0.7492 0.4537 −0.7916 0.4286
TX 1.2588 0.2081 −0.5374 0.5910
UT 1.7710 0.0766 −0.6483 0.5168
VA −2.0075 0.0447 0.1069 0.9149
VT 1.9373 0.0527 1.9037 0.0570
WA 1.0119 0.3116 −0.3026 0.7622
WI −3.2034 0.0014 −2.3822 0.0172
WV −0.5672 0.5706 0.6601 0.5092
WY −0.0235 0.9813 0.9006 0.3678
USA −5.6131 0.0000 1.3669 0.1716
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Table A2. Triples test for the US MSAs
City
Steepness Deepness
z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Abilene, TX 1.2890 0.1974 1.5156 0.1296
Akron, OH −2.5614 0.0104 −0.8398 0.401
Albany, GA −0.7988 0.4244 −0.6314 0.5278
Albany, OR −1.4575 0.1450 −2.3535 0.0186
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 3.2441 0.0012 2.3811 0.0173
Albuquerque, NM 3.7007 0.0000 0.1219 0.9029
Alexandria, LA −1.1567 0.2474 −1.0259 0.3049
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 1.3431 0.1792 −0.2412 0.8094
Altoona, PA 0.6472 0.5175 −0.4726 0.6365
Amarillo, TX 0.4210 0.6738 1.1206 0.2625
Ames, IA −1.1291 0.2588 −0.4359 0.6629
Anchorage, AK −1.0886 0.2763 0.8846 0.3764
Ann Arbor, MI −1.9511 0.0510 −0.6505 0.5154
Anniston-Oxford-Jacksonville, AL −1.7226 0.0850 −0.6238 0.5327
Appleton, WI −1.4231 0.1547 −1.119 0.2631
Asheville, NC −2.4495 0.0143 −0.5914 0.5543
Athens-Clarke County, GA −0.5927 0.5534 −0.4169 0.6767
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA −2.2066 0.0273 −0.3228 0.7468
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ 4.1726 0.0000 0.3518 0.725
Auburn-Opelika, AL −3.7128 0.0000 −0.8329 0.4049
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC −0.8786 0.3796 −0.5257 0.5991
Austin-Round Rock, TX −2.2274 0.0259 0.2873 0.7739
Bakersfield, CA 0.9382 0.3482 −1.0017 0.3165
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD −1.5014 0.1332 0.482 0.6298
Bangor, ME −1.1548 0.2482 0.7289 0.4661
Barnstable Town, MA 2.4491 0.0143 −0.4557 0.6486
Baton Rouge, LA 0.2864 0.7745 −0.6356 0.5251
Battle Creek, MI −2.2348 0.0254 −0.9152 0.3601
Bay City, MI −3.0674 0.0022 −1.0504 0.2935
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.8055 0.4205 1.2745 0.2025
Beckley, WV −1.1712 0.2415 −1.0393 0.2987
Bellingham, WA 2.1329 0.0329 0.0623 0.9503
Bend-Redmond, OR −2.8275 0.0047 −0.8307 0.4061
Billings, MT −0.0691 0.9449 −0.0965 0.9231
Binghamton, NY 4.4235 0.0000 0.8953 0.3706
Birmingham-Hoover, AL −1.8415 0.0655 −0.5932 0.5531
Bismarck, ND 2.3743 0.0176 −0.0806 0.9357
Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA −2.9398 0.0033 −0.3021 0.7626
Bloomington, IL 0.2921 0.7702 −0.8915 0.3727
Bloomington, IN −1.4789 0.1392 −0.8645 0.3873
Bloomsburg-Berwick, PA −0.3368 0.7362 −0.4656 0.6415
Boise City, ID 1.5448 0.1224 −0.2625 0.7929
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 2.2991 0.0215 −0.3012 0.7632
Boulder, CO 0.5591 0.5761 −0.4863 0.6268
Bowling Green, KY 3.0437 0.0023 −0.2497 0.8028
Bremerton-Silverdale, WA 0.2133 0.8311 −0.4685 0.6394
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 2.9784 0.0029 0.1279 0.8982
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Steepness Deepness
z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 1.5040 0.1326 1.4092 0.1588
Brunswick, GA −4.6152 0.0000 −0.2459 0.8058
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY 2.2406 0.0251 0.761 0.4467
Burlington, NC 0.0119 0.9905 −0.9272 0.3538
Burlington-South Burlington, VT 1.6186 0.1055 0.3197 0.7492
California-Lexington Park, MD −0.7249 0.4685 0.3734 0.7088
Canton-Massillon, OH −2.6604 0.0078 −0.6978 0.4853
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL −1.5029 0.1329 −0.9021 0.367
Cape Girardeau, MO-IL 0.1567 0.8755 1.2485 0.2118
Carbondale-Marion, IL 0.1882 0.8507 −0.7205 0.4712
Carson City, NV 0.2372 0.8125 0.0074 0.9941
Casper, WY −4.2402 0.0000 0.718 0.4727
Cedar Rapids, IA −1.6173 0.1058 −0.8998 0.3682
Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA 3.2757 0.0011 −0.3285 0.7425
Champaign-Urbana, IL 0.8933 0.3717 −0.8392 0.4014
Charleston, WV 0.1296 0.8969 −17.318 0.0000
Charleston-North Charleston, SC 1.0474 0.2949 17.8223 0.0000
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC −0.6203 0.5351 −0.5652 0.5719
Charlottesville, VA −2.9269 0.0034 −0.0461 0.9632
Chattanooga, TN-GA −0.8222 0.4109 −0.4323 0.6655
Cheyenne, WY 4.0057 0.0000 0.6206 0.5349
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI −2.0425 0.0411 −0.7842 0.4329
Chico, CA 0.8393 0.4013 −0.3246 0.7455
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN −1.8428 0.0654 −0.6951 0.487
Clarksville, TN-KY −1.3383 0.1808 −0.1882 0.8507
Cleveland, TN −1.7166 0.0861 −0.0538 0.9571
Cleveland-Elyria, OH −2.5110 0.0120 −0.9182 0.3585
Coeur d’Alene, ID 3.4297 0.0000 −0.3042 0.761
College Station-Bryan, TX 2.3414 0.0192 0.977 0.3286
Colorado Springs, CO −0.5301 0.5961 −0.6656 0.5057
Columbia, MO 0.3589 0.7196 0.8311 0.4059
Columbia, SC −0.7857 0.4320 −3.0106 0.0026
Columbus, GA-AL −3.3148 0.0000 −0.5494 0.5827
Columbus, IN 1.0991 0.2717 −1.2747 0.2024
Columbus, OH −1.3557 0.1752 −0.7015 0.483
Corpus Christi, TX 2.0408 0.0413 1.1082 0.2678
Corvallis, OR −1.9499 0.0512 −0.6563 0.5117
Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL 2.5588 0.0105 −0.5455 0.5854
Cumberland, MD-WV 0.3201 0.7489 0.0256 0.9796
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1.9362 0.0528 0.8359 0.4032
Dalton, GA −2.5019 0.0124 −0.5279 0.5976
Danville, IL −1.5007 0.1334 −1.182 0.2372
Daphne-Fairhope-Foley, AL −3.0270 0.0025 −0.8939 0.3714
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL −1.6811 0.0927 −0.8375 0.4023
Dayton, OH −1.2170 0.2236 −0.9248 0.3551
Decatur, AL −1.2910 0.1967 −0.899 0.3687
Decatur, IL −1.6874 0.0915 −0.8393 0.4013
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL −1.0902 0.2756 −0.5565 0.5779
Continued of Table A2
14 C. André et al. Are housing price cycles asymmetric? Evidence from the US states and metropolitan areas
City
Steepness Deepness
z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO −0.2714 0.7861 −0.4042 0.6861
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA −0.8200 0.4122 –0.926 0.3545
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI −1.8742 0.0609 −1.1349 0.2564
Dothan, AL −1.6074 0.1080 −0.7266 0.4675
Dover, DE −0.3946 0.6931 −0.4981 0.6184
Dubuque, IA −0.2975 0.7661 −0.7324 0.4639
Duluth, MN-WI −2.4460 0.0144 −0.2217 0.8245
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC −0.2554 0.7984 −0.4999 0.6172
East Stroudsburg, PA −1.5398 0.1236 −0.4901 0.6241
Eau Claire, WI −2.0505 0.0403 −1.0604 0.289
El Centro, CA 0.6703 0.5027 −0.9432 0.3456
Elizabethtown-Fort Knox, KY 0.1295 0.8969 −0.09 0.9283
Elkhart-Goshen, IN 0.2682 0.7885 −1.5831 0.1134
Elmira, NY 4.2836 0.0000 0.5394 0.6137
El Paso, TX 3.2448 0.0012 1.5157 0.1296
Erie, PA 0.2658 0.7904 −0.1103 0.9122
Eugene, OR −1.2428 0.2140 −0.6481 0.5169
Evansville, IN-KY 2.2311 0.0257 −1.2215 0.2219
Fairbanks, AK −0.5035 0.6146 0.6474 0.5174
Fargo, ND-MN 0.7030 0.4820 −0.4834 0.6288
Farmington, NM 0.0472 0.9623 −0.1476 0.8827
Fayetteville, NC −1.4854 0.1374 −0.7609 0.4467
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO −2.9924 0.0028 0.7318 0.4643
Flagstaff, AZ −1.2046 0.2283 −0.0715 0.943
Flint, MI −2.2081 0.0272 −1.1617 0.2454
Florence, SC −1.3083 0.1908 −0.7788 0.4361
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL −1.0336 0.3013 −0.9749 0.3296
Fond du Lac, WI −2.1743 0.0297 −1.2976 0.1944
Fort Collins, CO 1.2954 0.1952 −0.1047 0.9166
Fort Smith, AR-OK 0.4966 0.6195 0.802 0.4226
Fort Wayne, IN 1.5434 0.1227 −1.8129 0.0698
Fresno, CA 0.3301 0.7413 −0.5689 0.5695
Gadsden, AL −2.8761 0.0040 −0.6568 0.5113
Gainesville, FL −0.7843 0.4329 −0.5735 0.5663
Gainesville, GA −2.5167 0.0118 −0.4064 0.6844
Gettysburg, PA −1.3756 0.1690 −0.2084 0.8349
Glens Falls, NY 3.4026 0.0000 0.6296 0.5289
Goldsboro, NC −1.1105 0.2668 −0.7363 0.4615
Grand Forks, ND-MN 1.1604 0.2459 −0.1559 0.8761
Grand Island, NE −0.9832 0.3255 −0.2423 0.8086
Grand Junction, CO −7.5320 0.0000 −0.2398 0.8105
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI −2.2748 0.0229 −0.8448 0.3982
Grants Pass, OR −2.1783 0.0294 −0.6196 0.5355
Great Falls, MT 0.8684 0.3852 −0.05 0.9602
Greeley, CO −2.0541 0.0400 −0.5892 0.5557
Green Bay, WI −1.8469 0.0648 −1.1323 0.2575
Greensboro-High Point, NC −0.6724 0.5013 −0.6551 0.5124
Greenville, NC 0.1285 0.8978 −0.6824 0.495
Continued of Table A2
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Greenville-Anderson-Mauldin, SC 0.6178 0.5367 −1.1819 0.2372
Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, MS 0.4504 0.6524 0.8552 0.3924
Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV −1.9731 0.0485 −0.0608 0.9515
Hammond, LA 1.2951 0.1953 −0.6601 0.5092
Hanford-Corcoran, CA 0.5648 0.5722 −0.534 0.5934
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 0.5293 0.5966 −0.3673 0.7134
Harrisonburg, VA −2.3165 0.0205 −0.0761 0.9393
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 3.0651 0.0022 0.0518 0.9587
Hattiesburg, MS 0.7520 0.4520 1.3185 0.1873
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC −7.0856 0.0000 −0.9168 0.3593
Hilton Head Island-Bluffton-Beaufort, SC −1.7112 0.0870 −0.5722 0.5672
Hinesville, GA −0.6396 0.5225 −0.4374 0.6618
Homosassa Springs, FL −0.6011 0.5478 −0.6009 0.5479
Hot Springs, AR −0.5956 0.5514 0.392 0.6951
Houma-Thibodaux, LA −3.3606 0.0000 −0.499 0.6178
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX −0.2473 0.8047 1.312 0.1895
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH −1.2525 0.2104 −1.1271 0.2597
Huntsville, AL 0.4413 0.6590 −0.4558 0.6485
Idaho Falls, ID 1.4437 0.1488 −0.5011 0.6163
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN −0.2365 0.8130 −1.2727 0.2031
Iowa City, IA −0.1837 0.8542 −0.6843 0.4938
Ithaca, NY 3.0805 0.0021 0.6148 0.5387
Jackson, MI −2.0977 0.0359 −1.3559 0.1751
Jackson, MS 1.1868 0.2353 1.1366 0.2557
Jackson, TN −1.2641 0.2062 −0.4879 0.6256
Jacksonville, FL −1.7965 0.0724 −0.571 0.568
Jacksonville, NC −1.2612 0.2072 −0.6265 0.531
Janesville-Beloit, WI −1.5658 0.1174 −1.1945 0.2323
Jefferson City, MO 1.0814 0.2795 1.1459 0.2518
Johnson City, TN −0.3817 0.7027 −13.2276 0.0000
Johnstown, PA −1.3387 0.1807 −0.4828 0.6292
Jonesboro, AR −0.3187 0.7500 0.7954 0.4264
Joplin, MO 1.4797 0.1390 1.2609 0.2073
Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI −1.5182 0.1290 0.585 0.5585
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI −2.4739 0.0134 −0.8663 0.3863
Kankakee, IL −3.0154 0.0026 −0.5768 0.5641
Kansas City, MO-KS 1.3491 0.1773 0.4059 0.6848
Kennewick-Richland, WA 0.2442 0.8070 −0.9365 0.349
Killeen-Temple, TX 0.9766 0.3288 1.1131 0.2657
Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA −0.2071 0.8359 −0.1184 0.9058
Kingston, NY 3.4189 0.0000 0.485 0.6277
Knoxville, TN −0.3176 0.7508 −0.0607 0.9516
Kokomo, IN −1.0197 0.3078 −1.3589 0.1742
La Crosse-Onalaska, WI-MN −0.6560 0.5118 −0.8399 0.401
Lafayette, LA −3.4763 0.0000 −0.9748 0.3297
Lafayette-West Lafayette, IN −1.1377 0.2552 −1.3099 0.1902
Lake Charles, LA 1.5833 0.1134 −0.6961 0.4863
Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ −1.6144 0.1064 −0.0131 0.9895
Continued of Table A2
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z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL −0.6075 0.5435 −0.9134 0.361
Lancaster, PA 0.8249 0.4095 −0.3814 0.7029
Lansing-East Lansing, MI −2.5830 0.0098 −1.0101 0.3124
Laredo, TX 1.8237 0.0682 1.1891 0.2344
Las Cruces, NM 3.0230 0.0025 0.0098 0.9922
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV −0.0988 0.9213 −0.5442 0.5863
Lawrence, KS −1.9444 0.0518 −0.1201 0.9044
Lawton, OK −0.8534 0.3934 −0.7161 0.4739
Lebanon, PA 0.5160 0.6058 −0.5519 0.581
Lewiston, ID-WA 1.0508 0.2934 −0.3073 0.7586
Lewiston-Auburn, ME −0.1895 0.8497 0.3709 0.7107
Lexington-Fayette, KY 1.4907 0.1360 −0.4051 0.6854
Lima, OH −0.7093 0.4781 −0.9463 0.344
Lincoln, NE 1.6853 0.0919 −0.2056 0.8371
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 0.9074 0.3642 0.4917 0.623
Logan, UT-ID 2.6831 0.0073 −0.8683 0.3852
Longview, TX 1.6317 0.1027 0.9466 0.3438
Longview, WA −2.0291 0.0424 −0.8453 0.3979
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA −2.1515 0.0314 −0.457 0.6477
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN −1.0602 0.2890 −0.0033 0.9974
Lubbock, TX 1.9006 0.0574 1.1767 0.2393
Lynchburg, VA −2.9756 0.0029 −0.0488 0.9611
Macon, GA −2.8035 0.0051 0.531 0.5954
Madera, CA 0.0698 0.9443 −1.0345 0.3009
Madison, WI −2.8550 0.0043 −12.5336 0.0000
Manchester-Nashua, NH −3.1215 0.0018 0.9223 0.3564
Manhattan, KS −0.3452 0.7299 0.2713 0.7862
Mankato-North Mankato, MN −1.5458 0.1222 −0.228 0.8197
Mansfield, OH −2.8127 0.0049 −1.2605 0.2075
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 1.9691 0.0489 2.943 0.0033
Medford, OR −2.7651 0.0057 −0.2118 0.8323
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 0.0242 0.9807 −1.7773 0.0755
Merced, CA −1.6203 0.1052 −0.0751 0.9401
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL −0.2261 0.8211 −0.3073 0.7587
Michigan City-La Porte, IN −2.9505 0.0032 0.037 0.9705
Midland, MI −2.2293 0.0258 0.7794 0.4358
Midland, TX 3.5009 0.0000 0.7451 0.4562
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI −3.2061 0.0013 −1.8414 0.0656
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI −0.1704 0.8647 −1.2229 0.2214
Missoula, MT −0.8504 0.3951 0.6516 0.5146
Mobile, AL −0.1694 0.8655 −1.4418 0.1494
Modesto, CA −1.6700 0.0949 0.7255 0.4681
Monroe, LA −1.9474 0.0515 −0.9105 0.3625
Monroe, MI −2.9983 0.0027 −0.1558 0.8762
Montgomery, AL −0.7348 0.4625 −0.4402 0.6598
Morgantown, WV −0.7826 0.4339 –0.616 0.5379
Morristown, TN 2.1225 0.0338 −0.0771 0.9386
Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA 0.6364 0.5245 −0.1966 0.8442
Continued of Table A2
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Muncie, IN −1.4845 0.1377 0.7834 0.4334
Muskegon, MI −0.5395 0.5895 −1.1858 0.2357
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC-NC −1.6350 0.1020 −0.6146 0.5388
Napa, CA −3.1707 0.0015 0.6256 0.5316
Naples-Immokalee-Marco Island, FL −1.5614 0.1184 0.4507 0.6522
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 1.8126 0.0699 −0.5172 0.605
New Bern, NC 0.0340 0.9729 0.5542 0.5794
New Haven-Milford, CT 3.2944 0.0000 1.2502 0.2112
New Orleans-Metairie, LA −1.8806 0.0600 0.8241 0.4099
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 1.7778 0.0754 1.4242 0.1544
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI −4.4644 0.0000 −1.1903 0.2339
North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton, FL −1.3786 0.1680 −0.7338 0.4631
Norwich-New London, CT 1.1581 0.2468 1.235 0.2168
Ocala, FL −1.1613 0.2455 −1.1393 0.2546
Ocean City, NJ 3.4801 0.0000 0.5718 0.5675
Odessa, TX 2.9948 0.0027 −0.244 0.8073
Ogden-Clearfield, UT 2.5976 0.0094 −0.4751 0.6347
Oklahoma City, OK −0.3859 0.6995 −2.3283 0.0199
Olympia-Tumwater, WA −0.4959 0.6199 −0.849 0.3959
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 1.4906 0.1361 1.2641 0.2062
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL −0.6837 0.4941 −0.75 0.4533
Oshkosh-Neenah, WI −1.8624 0.0625 −2.6952 0.007
Owensboro, KY 3.1576 0.0016 −0.9863 0.324
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA −1.3234 0.1857 0.244 0.8072
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 0.4551 0.6490 −0.4473 0.6546
Panama City, FL 0.8927 0.3720 −1.2568 0.2088
Parkersburg-Vienna, WV 1.2751 0.2023 0.1956 0.845
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 0.3194 0.7494 −0.7851 0.4324
Peoria, IL −3.1193 0.0018 0.382 0.7024
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 0.3257 0.7446 1.1753 0.2399
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ −0.2853 0.7755 −0.5289 0.5968
Pine Bluff, AR 0.1782 0.8586 0.5673 0.5705
Pittsburgh, PA 2.1313 0.0331 −0.0178 0.9858
Pittsfield, MA 0.1134 0.9097 0.1868 0.8518
Pocatello, ID 2.9084 0.0036 2.3302 0.0198
Portland-South Portland, ME 1.1019 0.2705 1.8053 0.071
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA −1.5692 0.1166 −9.417 0.0000
Port St. Lucie, FL −0.8140 0.4156 −3.3176 0.00091
Prescott, AZ −1.5408 0.1234 −0.4198 0.6747
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA 3.3497 0.0000 0.2097 0.8339
Provo-Orem, UT 1.1206 0.2625 −0.516 0.6059
Pueblo, CO −1.3275 0.1843 1.826 0.0679
Punta Gorda, FL −1.4468 0.1480 −0.5772 0.5638
Racine, WI −4.8334 0.0000 −2.5737 0.0101
Raleigh, NC 0.7664 0.4434 1.7244 0.0846
Rapid City, SD −1.6480 0.0994 1.5149 0.1298
Reading, PA 0.8831 0.3772 1.2578 0.2085
Redding, CA 0.2234 0.8232 0.3855 0.6998
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z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Reno, NV 0.6179 0.5366 −1.0087 0.3131
Richmond, VA −2.2430 0.0249 −0.4821 0.6297
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA −2.1903 0.0285 0.1558 0.8762
Roanoke, VA −2.6974 0.0070 −1.0178 0.3088
Rochester, MN 0.0341 0.9728 −1.0936 0.2741
Rochester, NY 2.2456 0.0247 0.483 0.6291
Rockford, IL −2.9319 0.0034 −1.0246 0.3055
Rocky Mount, NC −1.9876 0.0469 0.0384 0.9694
Rome, GA −4.2333 0.0000 −1.0725 0.2835
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA −1.9009 0.0573 0.0721 0.9425
Saginaw, MI −3.4549 0.0000 0.1849 0.8533
St. Cloud, MN −2.0475 0.0406 −0.9904 0.322
St. George, UT 0.8761 0.3810 −0.8325 0.4051
St. Joseph, MO-KS −1.3829 0.1667 0.9999 0.3173
St. Louis, MO-IL −0.0598 0.9523 −0.1818 0.8558
Salem, OR −1.6606 0.0968 −0.1712 0.864
Salinas, CA −2.1342 0.0328 0.5255 0.5993
Salisbury, MD-DE −1.0777 0.2812 −0.0122 0.9902
Salt Lake City, UT 1.4956 0.1348 −0.7795 0.4357
San Angelo, TX 3.3209 0.0000 1.7813 0.0749
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 0.6797 0.4967 1.1786 0.2386
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA −0.3997 0.6894 0.4538 0.65
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA −1.4264 0.1538 1.2091 0.2266
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 0.7877 0.4309 1.2065 0.2276
San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles-Arroyo Grande, CA 0.2991 0.7649 0.1056 0.9159
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA −1.1327 0.2574 1.2331 0.2175
Santa Fe, NM −1.6625 0.0964 0.8796 0.3791
Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA −3.5579 0.0000 0.8846 0.3764
Santa Rosa, CA −1.5300 0.1260 0.8824 0.3776
Savannah, GA −1.5575 0.1194 −0.0806 0.9357
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 0.2968 0.7666 −0.6117 0.5407
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 1.5734 0.1156 0.0748 0.9404
Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL −1.4301 0.1527 −0.0744 0.9407
Sebring, FL −2.1397 0.0324 −0.9948 0.3198
Sheboygan, WI −2.2942 0.0218 −0.6168 0.5374
Sherman-Denison, TX 0.7832 0.4335 1.0199 0.3078
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA −2.3445 0.0191 −0.362 0.7173
Sierra Vista-Douglas, AZ −0.5881 0.5565 0.7594 0.4476
Sioux City, IA-NE-SD −0.2095 0.8340 0.0375 0.9701
Sioux Falls, SD 0.8184 0.4131 3.1021 0.0019
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 0.1460 0.8839 −0.8211 0.4116
Spartanburg, SC −1.2086 0.2268 −2.4079 0.016
Spokane-Spokane Valley, WA 0.3720 0.7099 −0.5793 0.5624
Springfield, IL 0.2871 0.7740 −0.8575 0.3911
Springfield, MA 1.6648 0.0959 0.5656 0.5717
Springfield, MO 0.0861 0.9314 0.6391 0.5228
Springfield, OH −2.9955 0.0027 −0.4705 0.638
State College, PA 0.6749 0.4998 0.0483 0.9615
Continued of Table A2
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Steepness Deepness
z-stat p-value z-stat p-value
Staunton-Waynesboro, VA −2.4212 0.0155 −0.4225 0.6727
Stockton-Lodi, CA −3.0645 0.0022 0.4679 0.6398
Sumter, SC −1.2001 0.2301 0.5857 0.5581
Syracuse, NY 2.2885 0.0221 −0.9081 0.3638
Tallahassee, FL 0.2053 0.8373 0.6177 0.5368
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL −0.6092 0.5424 −0.8141 0.4156
Terre Haute, IN −1.4046 0.1601 −0.0914 0.9272
Texarkana, TX-AR 2.6747 0.0075 −0.5331 0.594
The Villages, FL 1.0998 0.2714 0.9834 0.3254
Toledo, OH −3.0712 0.0021 −0.5016 0.6159
Topeka, KS 0.1388 0.8896 −1.8577 0.0632
Trenton, NJ 3.1214 0.0018 1.4119 0.158
Tucson, AZ −0.0795 0.9366 −0.607 0.5438
Tulsa, OK 0.2273 0.8202 –1.04 0.2983
Tuscaloosa, AL −0.5260 0.5989 0.5619 0.5742
Tyler, TX 1.9065 0.0566 −0.2412 0.8094
Urban Honolulu, HI 3.7424 0.0000 0.399 0.6899
Utica-Rome, NY 2.7676 0.0056 0.5466 0.5847
Valdosta, GA −2.5480 0.0108 1.0674 0.2858
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA −3.3090 0.0000 0.2763 0.7823
Victoria, TX 0.1693 0.8656 1.5051 0.1323
Vineland-Bridgeton, NJ 0.0789 0.9371 −0.0568 0.9547
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC −0.0416 0.9668 −0.6537 0.5133
Visalia-Porterville, CA 0.7977 0.4250 −0.727 0.4672
Waco, TX 1.4500 0.1471 −0.8627 0.3883
Walla Walla, WA −0.5672 0.5706 0.8084 0.4189
Warner Robins, GA −2.0141 0.0440 −0.6527 0.514
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV −1.0991 0.2717 0.3888 0.6974
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA −1.7512 0.0799 −1.6639 0.0961
Watertown-Fort Drum, NY 5.5675 0.0000 1.8065 0.0708
Wausau, WI −2.5290 0.0114 −2.1883 0.0286
Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH −2.3368 0.0194 −0.5583 0.5766
Wenatchee, WA 0.9975 0.3185 −1.993 0.0463
Wheeling, WV-OH −0.5432 0.5870 0.2609 0.7942
Wichita, KS 2.1059 0.0352 2.4434 0.0145
Wichita Falls, TX 1.6916 0.0907 0.1799 0.8572
Williamsport, PA 0.5138 0.6074 −0.5566 0.5778
Wilmington, NC 0.1330 0.8942 −0.6426 0.5205
Winchester, VA-WV −1.8620 0.0626 −0.7308 0.4649
Winston-Salem, NC −1.4835 0.1379 −0.3948 0.693
Worcester, MA-CT 0.8631 0.3881 0 0.9711
Yakima, WA 0.0241 0.9808 0.7176 0.473
York-Hanover, PA 0.2699 0.7873 0.4219 0.6731
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA −2.0057 0.0449 −0.5766 0.5642
Yuba City, CA −0.4579 0.6470 −0.6603 0.5091
Yuma, AZ −0.5136 0.6075 −0.667 0.5048
End of Table A2
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Table A3. Cases of deepness asymmetry according to the Triples and Entropy tests 
States
Triples test Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin
Entropy test Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Lou-
isiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, USA
MSAs
Triples test Albany, OR; Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; Charleston, WV; Charleston-North Charleston, SC; Columbia, 
SC; Fort Wayne, IN; Johnson City, TN; Madison, WI; McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX; Memphis, TN-MS-AR; 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI; Oklahoma City, OK; Oshkosh-Neenah, WI; Pocatello, ID; Portland-
South Portland, ME; Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA; Port St. Lucie, FL; Pueblo, CO; Racine, WI; Raleigh, 
NC; San Angelo, TX; Sioux Falls, SD; Spartanburg, SC; Topeka, KS; Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA; Watertown-Fort 
Drum, NY; Wausau, WI; Wenatchee, WA; Wichita, KS
Entropy test Akron, OH; Albany, GA; Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; Albuquerque, NM; Alexandria, LA; Anchorage, AK; 
Ann Arbor, MI; Anniston-Oxford-Jacksonville, AL; Asheville, NC; Athens-Clarke County, GA; Atlanta-Sandy 
Springs-Roswell, GA; Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ; Auburn-Opelika, AL; Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC; 
Bakersfield, CA; Bangor, ME; Barnstable Town, MA; Battle Creek, MI; Bay City, MI; Bellingham, WA; Bend-Red-
mond, OR; Binghamton, NY; Birmingham-Hoover, AL; Bismarck, ND; Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA; 
Bloomington, IN; Boise City, ID; Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH; Bowling Green, KY; Bremerton-Silver-
dale, WA; Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT; Brunswick, GA; Canton-Massillon, OH; Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL; 
Cape Girardeau, MO-IL; Carson City, NV; Casper, WY; Cedar Rapids, IA; Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA; Cham-
paign-Urbana, IL; Charleston-North Charleston, SC; Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC; Charlottesville, VA; 
Chattanooga, TN-GA; Cheyenne, WY; Chico, CA; Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN; Clarksville, TN-KY; Cleveland, TN; 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH; Coeur d’Alene, ID; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbus, GA-AL; Columbus, IN; Crestview-
Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL; Cumberland, MD-WV; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; Dalton, GA; Daphne-
Fairhope-Foley, AL; Duluth, MN-WI; Eau Claire, WI; El Centro, CA; Elizabethtown-Fort Knox, KY; Elmira, NY; El 
Paso, TX; Evansville, IN-KY; Fargo, ND-MN; Fayetteville, NC; Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO; Flint, MI; 
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL; Fond du Lac, WI; Fort Wayne, IN; Fresno, CA; Gadsden, AL; Gainesville, GA; Glens 
Falls, NY; Grand Forks, ND-MN; Grand Junction, CO; Grants Pass, OR; Greeley, CO; Gulfport-Biloxi-Pascagoula, 
MS; Hammond, LA; Hanford-Corcoran, CA; Harrisonburg, VA; Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT; Hat-
tiesburg, MS; Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC; Hilton Head Island-Bluffton-Beaufort, SC; Hinesville, GA; Hou-
ma-Thibodaux, LA; Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH; Ithaca, NY; Jackson, MI; Jackson, MS; Jefferson City, MO; 
Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI; Kalamazoo-Portage, MI; Kankakee, IL; Kansas City, MO-KS; Kennewick-Richland, 
WA; Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA; Kingston, NY; La Crosse-Onalaska, WI-MN; Lafayette, LA; Lake Havasu 
City-Kingman, AZ; Lansing-East Lansing, MI; Las Cruces, NM; Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV; Lawrence, 
KS; Lexington-Fayette, KY; Lima, OH; Lincoln, NE; Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR; Logan, UT-ID; 
Longview, WA; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA; Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN; Lubbock, TX; Lynch-
burg, VA; Macon, GA; Madera, CA; Madison, WI; Manchester-Nashua, NH; Mansfield, OH; McAllen-Edinburg-
Mission, TX; Medford, OR; Merced, CA; Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL; Michigan City-La Porte, 
IN; Midland, MI; Midland, TX; Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI; Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-
WI; Missoula, MT; Modesto, CA; Monroe, LA; Monroe, MI; Morristown, TN; Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA; 
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC-NC; Napa, CA; Naples-Immokalee-Marco Island, FL; Nashville-
Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN; New Haven-Milford, CT; New Orleans-Metairie, LA; New York-Newark-
Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA; Niles-Benton Harbor, MI; Ocala, FL; Ocean City, NJ; Odessa, TX; Ogden-Clearfield, UT; 
Oklahoma City, OK; Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA; Owensboro, KY; Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA; Palm 
Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL; Peoria, IL; Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ; Pocatello, ID; Port St. Lucie, FL; Prescott, 
AZ; Providence-Warwick, RI-MA; Provo-Orem, UT; Pueblo, CO; Punta Gorda, FL; Racine, WI; Raleigh, NC; 
Rapid City, SD; Redding, CA; Reno, NV; Richmond, VA; Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA; Roanoke, VA; 
Rochester, NY; Rockford, IL; Rome, GA; Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA; Saginaw, MI; St. Cloud, MN; 
St. George, UT; St. Joseph, MO-KS; St. Louis, MO-IL; Salinas, CA; Salt Lake City, UT; San Angelo, TX; San Anto-
nio-New Braunfels, TX; San Diego-Carlsbad, CA; San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA; San Jose-Sunnyvale-San-
ta Clara, CA; Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA; Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA; Santa Rosa, CA; Savannah, GA; Seattle-
Tacoma-Bellevue, WA; Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL; Shreveport-Bossier City, LA; Sioux Falls, SD; Spokane-Spokane 
Valley, WA; Springfield, MO; Springfield, OH; State College, PA; Staunton-Waynesboro, VA; Stockton-Lodi, CA; 
Syracuse, NY; Terre Haute, IN; Texarkana, TX-AR; Toledo, OH; Trenton, NJ; Tulsa, OK; Tuscaloosa, AL; Urban 
Honolulu, HI; Utica-Rome, NY; Valdosta, GA; Vallejo-Fairfield, CA; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-
NC; Visalia-Porterville, CA; Walla Walla, WA; Warner Robins, GA; Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA; Watertown-Fort 
Drum, NY; Wausau, WI; Wenatchee, WA; Wichita, KS; Wichita Falls, TX; Winchester, VA-WV; Youngstown-
Warren-Boardman, OH-PA; Yuba City, CA
Note: The significance threshold is 10%.
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Table A4. Cases of steepness asymmetry according to the Triples and Entropy tests
States
Triples test Connecticut, California, Hawaii, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Louisiana, North Dakota, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, 
Wisconsin
Entropy test Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, USA
MSAs
Triples test Akron, OH; Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; Albuquerque, NM; Ann Arbor, MI; Anniston-Oxford-Jacksonville, 
AL; Asheville, NC; Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA; Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ; Auburn-Opelika, AL; 
Austin-Round Rock, TX; Barnstable Town, MA; Battle Creek, MI; Bay City, MI; Bellingham, WA; Bend-Red-
mond, OR; Binghamton, NY; Birmingham-Hoover, AL; Bismarck, ND; Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA; 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH; Bowling Green, KY; Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT; Brunswick, GA; 
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY; Canton-Massillon, OH; Casper, WY; Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA; 
Charlottesville, VA; Cheyenne, WY; Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI; Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN; Cleveland, TN; 
Cleveland-Elyria, OH; Coeur d’Alene, ID; College Station-Bryan, TX; Columbus, GA-AL; Corpus Christi, TX; 
Corvallis, OR; Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; Dalton, GA; Daph-
ne-Fairhope-Foley, AL; Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL; Decatur, IL; Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI; Duluth, 
MN-WI; Eau Claire, WI; Elmira, NY; El Paso, TX; Evansville, IN-KY; Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO; 
Flint, MI; Fond du Lac, WI; Gadsden, AL; Gainesville, GA; Glens Falls, NY; Grand Junction, CO; Grand Rapids-
Wyoming, MI; Grants Pass, OR; Greeley, CO; Green Bay, WI; Hagerstown-Martinsburg, MD-WV; Harrisonburg, 
VA; Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT; Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC; Hilton Head Island-Bluffton-
Beaufort, SC; Houma-Thibodaux, LA; Ithaca, NY; Jackson, MI; Jacksonville, FL; Kalamazoo-Portage, MI; Kanka-
kee, IL; Kingston, NY; Lafayette, LA; Lansing-East Lansing, MI; Laredo, TX; Las Cruces, NM; Lawrence, KS; Lin-
coln, NE; Logan, UT-ID; Longview, WA; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA; Lubbock, TX; Lynchburg, VA; 
Macon, GA; Madison, WI; Manchester-Nashua, NH; Mansfield, OH; McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX; Medford, 
OR; Michigan City-La Porte, IN; Midland, MI; Midland, TX; Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI; Modesto, CA; 
Monroe, LA; Monroe, MI; Morristown, TN; Napa, CA; Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN; New 
Haven-Milford, CT; New Orleans-Metairie, LA; New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA; Niles-Benton Harbor, 
MI; Ocean City, NJ; Odessa, TX; Ogden-Clearfield, UT; Oshkosh-Neenah, WI; Owensboro, KY; Peoria, IL; Pitts-
burgh, PA; Pocatello, ID; Providence-Warwick, RI-MA; Racine, WI; Rapid City, SD; Richmond, VA; Riverside-
San Bernardino-Ontario, CA; Roanoke, VA; Rochester, NY; Rockford, IL; Rocky Mount, NC; Rome, GA; Sacra-
mento-Roseville-Arden-Arcade, CA; Saginaw, MI; St. Cloud, MN; Salem, OR; Salinas, CA; San Angelo, TX; Santa 
Fe, NM; Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA; Sebring, FL; Sheboygan, WI; Shreveport-Bossier City, LA; Springfield, 
MA; Springfield, OH; Staunton-Waynesboro, VA; Stockton-Lodi, CA; Syracuse, NY; Texarkana, TX-AR; Toledo, 
OH; Trenton, NJ; Tyler, TX; Urban Honolulu, HI; Utica-Rome, NY; Valdosta, GA; Vallejo-Fairfield, CA; Warner 
Robins, GA; Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA; Watertown-Fort Drum, NY; Wausau, WI; Weirton-Steubenville, WV-OH; 
Wichita, KS; Wichita Falls, TX; Winchester, VA-WV; Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA
Entropy test Akron, OH; Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY; Albuquerque, NM; Alexandria, LA; Anchorage, AK; Ann Arbor, MI; 
Anniston-Oxford-Jacksonville, AL; Asheville, NC; Athens-Clarke County, GA; Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, 
GA; Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ; Auburn-Opelika, AL; Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC; Bakersfield, CA; 
Bangor, ME; Barnstable Town, MA; Battle Creek, MI; Bay City, MI; Bellingham, WA; Bend-Redmond, OR; Bing-
hamton, NY; Birmingham-Hoover, AL; Bismarck, ND; Blacksburg-Christiansburg-Radford, VA; Bloomington, 
IN; Boise City, ID; Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH; Bowling Green, KY; Bremerton-Silverdale, WA; Bridge-
port-Stamford-Norwalk, CT; Brunswick, GA; Canton-Massillon, OH; Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL; Cape Girardeau, 
MO-IL; Carson City, NV; Casper, WY; Cedar Rapids, IA; Chambersburg-Waynesboro, PA; Champaign-Urbana, 
IL; Charleston-North Charleston, SC; Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC; Charlottesville, VA; Chattanooga, TN-
GA; Cheyenne, WY; Chico, CA; Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN; Clarksville, TN-KY; Cleveland, TN; Cleveland-Elyria, 
OH; Coeur d’Alene, ID; College Station-Bryan, TX; Colorado Springs, CO; Columbus, GA-AL; Columbus, IN; 
Crestview-Fort Walton Beach-Destin, FL; Cumberland, MD-WV; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; Dalton, GA; 
Daphne-Fairhope-Foley, AL; Duluth, MN-WI; Eau Claire, WI; El Centro, CA; Elizabethtown-Fort Knox, KY; Elmi-
ra, NY; El Paso, TX; Evansville, IN-KY; Fargo, ND-MN; Fayetteville, NC; Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO; 
Flint, MI; Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL; Fond du Lac, WI; Fort Wayne, IN; Fresno, CA; Gadsden, AL; Gainesville, 
GA; Glens Falls, NY; Grand Forks, ND-MN; Grand Junction, CO; Grants Pass, OR; Greeley, CO; Gulfport-Biloxi-
Pascagoula, MS; Hammond, LA; Hanford-Corcoran, CA; Harrisonburg, VA; Hartford-West Hartford-East Hart-
ford, CT; Hattiesburg, MS; Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC; Hilton Head Island-Bluffton-Beaufort, SC; Hinesville, 
GA; Houma-Thibodaux, LA; Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH; Ithaca, NY; Jackson, MI; Jackson, MS; Jefferson 
City, MO; Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina, HI; Kalamazoo-Portage, MI; Kankakee, IL; Kansas City, MO-KS; Kenne-
wick-Richland, WA; Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA; Kingston, NY; La Crosse-Onalaska, WI-MN; Lafayette, LA; 
Lake Havasu City-Kingman, AZ; Lansing-East Lansing, MI; Las Cruces, NM; Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV; 
22 C. André et al. Are housing price cycles asymmetric? Evidence from the US states and metropolitan areas
States
Entropy test Lawrence, KS; Lexington-Fayette, KY; Lima, OH; Lincoln, NE; Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR; Logan, 
UT-ID; Longview, WA; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA; Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN; Lubbock, TX; 
Lynchburg, VA; Macon, GA; Madera, CA; Madison, WI; Manchester-Nashua, NH; Mansfield, OH; McAllen-Ed-
inburg-Mission, TX; Medford, OR; Merced, CA; Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL; Michigan City-La 
Porte, IN; Midland, MI; Midland, TX; Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI; Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, 
MN-WI; Missoula, MT; Modesto, CA; Monroe, LA; Monroe, MI; Morristown, TN; Mount Vernon-Anacortes, WA; 
Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach, SC-NC; Napa, CA; Naples-Immokalee-Marco Island, FL; Nashville-Da-
vidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN; New Haven-Milford, CT; New Orleans-Metairie, LA; New York-Newark-
Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA; Niles-Benton Harbor, MI; Ocala, FL; Ocean City, NJ; Odessa, TX; Ogden-Clearfield, UT; 
Oklahoma City, OK; Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA; Owensboro, KY; Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA; Palm 
Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL; Peoria, IL; Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ; Pocatello, ID; Port St. Lucie, FL; Prescott, 
AZ; Providence-Warwick, RI-MA; Provo-Orem, UT; Pueblo, CO; Punta Gorda, FL; Racine, WI; Raleigh, NC; Rapid 
City, SD; Redding, CA; Reno, NV; Richmond, VA; Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA; Roanoke, VA; Roch-
ester, MN; Rockford, IL; Rome, GA; Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA; Saginaw, MI; St. Cloud, MN; St. 
George, UT; St. Joseph, MO-KS; St. Louis, MO-IL; Salinas, CA; Salt Lake City, UT; San Angelo, TX; San Antonio-
New Braunfels, TX; San Diego-Carlsbad, CA; San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA; San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, 
CA; Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA; Santa Maria-Santa Barbara, CA; Santa Rosa, CA; Savannah, GA; Seattle-Tacoma-
Bellevue, WA; Sebastian-Vero Beach, FL; Shreveport-Bossier City, LA; Sioux Falls, SD; Spokane-Spokane Valley, WA; 
Springfield, MO; Springfield, OH; State College, PA; Stockton-Lodi, CA; Syracuse, NY; Terre Haute, IN; Texarkana, 
TX-AR; Toledo, OH; Trenton, NJ; Tulsa, OK; Tuscaloosa, AL; Urban Honolulu, HI; Utica-Rome, NY; Valdosta, 
GA; Vallejo-Fairfield, CA; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC; Visalia-Porterville, CA; Walla Walla, 
WA; Warner Robins, GA; Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA; Watertown-Fort Drum, NY; Wausau, WI; Wenatchee, WA; 
Wichita, KS; Wichita Falls, TX; Winchester, VA-WV; Winston-Salem, NC; Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-
PA; Yuba City, CA
Note: The significance threshold is 10%.
End of Table A4
